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KANT A CHRISTIAN? A REPLY TO PALMQUIST
Anthony N. Perovich, Jr.

Stephen Palmquist has suggested that the alternative perspectives that constitute the Critical system allow for the acceptance of Christian doctrine and
experience as traditionally understood, even though Kant tends to emphasize
a moral interpretation. In fact, however, Kant can provide only a practical
justification and indeed only a practical interpretation for much that is essential to Christianity; in several key cases he can acknowledge none but the
moral standpoint. I conclude with some reflections on how a Kantian who
wishes to be a Christian as well might supplement the Critical philosophy in
order to make this possible.

The interpreter of Kant finds it difficult to avoid raising questions about
the historical and logical relations that hold between the Critical philosophy
and the traditional doctrines of Christianity. Kant's Lutheran and specifically
Pietist background informs all his mature works (however completely he may
have separated himself from that heritage in some respects), and his attempt
in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone to render Christian teachings
philosophically excites curiosity about its success. In a recent issue of Faith
and Philosophy, Stephen Palmquist has addressed the logical question and
concluded that Kant's religious views are thoroughly consistent with the
tenets of Christianity. I Indeed, Palmquist considers us compelled "to view
Kant as having developed a radically Christian philosophy"(p. 73).
We are able to appreciate the compatibility of Christianity and the Critical
philosophy, in Palmquist's view, by coming to understand the set of complementary standpoints that he calls Kant's "System of Perspectives." It is the
discovery and development of this system that constitute the fundamental
Critical undertaking and accomplishment: "Kant's main goal is not (as commonly supposed) to establish a particular set of transcendental ·principles' ..
. . [Rather] his main purpose must be to delineate the pattern of thinking
which the philosopher must adopt in order to construct a coherent philosophical system. "2 Each particular pattern of thinking, or perspective, offers "a
way of looking at a certain question or set of questions: it acts as a context
or a set of assumptions on the basis of which such questions can be answered"
(p. 67). Because there are a number of such standpoints, an important task
for Kant consists in distinguishing them one from another and in determining
their relationships: "the general goal which motivates all his Critical endeavFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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ors is to elucidate the difference between various human perspectives and to
demonstrate how they can work together in a single, coherent, systematic
explanation of human experience" (p. 67).
The mistake that interpreters of Kant have made, according to Palmquist,
has been to ignore how these perspectives "work together." Theological doctrines and religious experience may in fact be explained in the light of a
number of standpoints; Kant's views appear opposed to Christian teachings
only when one erroneously supposes that his explicit accounts of doctrine or
experience offer the only interpretations that the Critical philosophy can
countenance. By recognizing that the different perspectives are not mutually exclusive but rather can present alternative yet compatible explanations of the same phenomena, we come to see that the typical Critical
religious pronouncements are not at odds with those made from the traditionally Christian point of view; rather, while both consider the very same
theological doctrines and religious experiences, they do so from different
perspectives, and these perspectives are not only equally legitimate, they
in fact both contribute to a systematic, coherent, and comprehensive understanding of religious matters.
Palmquist is undoubtedly correct in stressing the importance of appreciating the different perspectives that together constitute the Critical system (as
well as in emphasizing that Kant's attitude toward the project of proving
God's existence need not be thought to conflict with the teachings of Scripture
regarding our knowledge of God (pp. 68-71». Moreover, I think he has raised
an important question about what it means to be both a Kantian and a Christian. Nevertheless, what he says about the legitimacy of different perspectives
on religious topics is demonstrably wrong as an interpretation of Kant's
views. In what follows, I shall show that Critical religious views do not admit
of the reading Palmquist offers, try to situate the disallowance of alternative
perspectives within a Kantian context which indisputably recognizes other
occasions when different perspectives are permitted, and conclude with some
reflections on what is required if one is to be a Christian who is also a Kantian.

I
It is true, Palmquist admits, that Kant's religious views are typically
couched in moral language; nevertheless, a properly Critical stance acknowledges the possibility of other perspectives on these matters as well: "Throughout his works Kant's comments are usually purposefully limited to the
practical standpoint, so that he often ends up explaining (theoretical) theological doctrines or (empirical) religious experiences in practical (i.e.,
moral) terms. However, he never claims that the practical standpoint is the
only legitimate context for interpreting such doctrines or experiences" (p.
72). Rather, viewed from the general vantage supplied by his "System of
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Perspectives," Kant aims at integrating that moral standpoint into a broader,
synoptic framework.
According to Palmquist, Kant's openness and flexibility are (or should be)
evident in his attitudes toward both religious experience and theological
doctrine. However, even if we turn to the examples that Palmquist provides
or that his discussion suggests, we find in Kant anything but the accommodating breadth of vision that the "System of Perspectives" leads us to expect.
Kant's attitude toward prayer is supposedly an example of how religious
phenomena admit of multiple interpretations: "When, for instance, he analyzes the practical value of prayer as an inner stimulus, intended 'to induce
in us a moral disposition,' he is not precluding the legitimacy of also regarding the immediate experience of prayer as a form of communion with God"
(p. 72). Yet Kant's authoritative Critical treatment of prayer clearly rules out
the acceptability of such complementary levels of understanding. He distinguishes between the spirit of prayer and the letter of it; the former is a
disposition to act as if one were in God's service, the latter consists in stated
wishes directed toward God. 3 These are for Kant kinds of prayer, in fact the
two sorts that he recognizes. The former might not be acknowledged to be
prayer at all by many Christians; the latter, which is what Palmquist understands by prayer (or as close as Kant gets to it), falls away as a result of
proper moral development and has value only for the quickening of our
disposition to behave morally.4 And while Palmquist believes that Kant holds
open the possibility that such prayer may be viewed as communion with God,
Kant's own characterization hardly suggests such an interpretation: although
ostensibly involved in speaking with God, verbal prayer involves nothing
more than "conversing within and really with oneself."5
Kant's alleged openness to the supernatural is cited as further evidence of
the flexibility of his system.
Kant was admittedly highly suspicious of extremes such as religious "fanaticism" and "clericalism." But this should not blind us to the fact that he
always kept an open mind with regard to the possibility of an irrational (or
arational) experience of the supernatural, such as that in which he shows
considerable interest in his much neglected Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766).
Kant's rejection of such extremes does not entail a rejection of a balanced
attitude towards the possibility of supernatural experiences (p. 72).6

But this "open mind" is quite simply not displayed in the Critical writings.
That we lack a capacity for intellectual intuition, at least in this life, is, of
course, a constant for Kant's teaching, a constant that restricts our experience
to the sensible. Supposed supersensible insights of mystics are sometimes
dismissed as "monstrosities. "7 And the Critical attitude toward the supernatural is a good deal more hostile than Palmquist purports to discover in the
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Swedenborg's alleged second sight and intercourse
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with the realm of spirits are the immediate reference points for that text;
however its rather scoffing tone is interpreted, Kant's statements in the Critique of Pure Reason leave no doubt about the official Critical position regarding ghosts, clairvoyance, and ESP:
A substance which would be pennanently present in space, but without filling
it (like that mode of existence intermediate between matter and thinking being
which some would seek to introduce), or a special ultimate mental power of
intuitively anticipating the future (and not merely inferring it), or lastly a
power of standing in community of thought with other men, however distant
they may be-are concepts the possibility of which is altogether groundless,

as they cannot be based on experience and its known laws . ... g

The fact is that Kant took the interconnected whole of human experience to
be necessarily sensible (as well as regular, in the sense of necessarily conforming to natural laws of the sort that scientific investigation discovers);
not only does he rule out the alternative (supersensible and supernatural) sorts
of experience for which Palmquist apparently believes he finds a place, he
often enough rules them out quite emphatically.
The case of theological doctrine is precisely the same as that of religious
or supernatural experience. Palmquist similarly claims that, while Kant frequently offers a practical explanation for particular theological doctrines, one
should not conclude that other accounts (more in keeping with the Christian
tradition) are thereby ruled out. And once again, the Critical texts preclude
Palmquist's interpretation; the "openness" and "balance" he purports to find
in the mature Kant are quite simply not there.
Take, for example, Kant's discussion of the Trinity. The doctrine of the
Trinity is "a mystery, i.e., something holy which may indeed be known by
each single individual but cannot be made known publicly, that is, shared
universally."9 When expanded, this amounts to saying that God's tri-unity is
morally intelligible to us-we understand the moral relation of God to the
human race by regarding Him as holy Legislator, benevolent Ruler, and
righteous Judge-but is also theoretically unfathomable. God in Himself
transcends all our concepts: from a practical perspective He is to be regarded
as a tri-unity, but "apart from this context we can know nothing about Him. "to
The notion of God's trinitarian character offers no theoretical knowledge of
Him, indeed it does not even offer an intelligible theoretical conception of
Him. The moral perspective provides the only legitimate context for interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity because it cannot even be understood from
any other. 11
Palmquist attempts to make the Critical philosophy amenable to the Christian standpoint by suggesting that the moral interpretations of those doctrines
offered by Kant are not thought by him to exclude other, more traditional
interpretations. Such a reading, however, conflicts with Kant's texts on every

99

KANT A CHRISTIAN?

page. To see how to be a Kantian Christian requires more than Palmquist's
evident generosity; one must have a better understanding of the interrelations
of the Critical perspectives, and one must be willing to use this knowledge
as the basis for suggested revisions in the system of transcendental idealism.

II
... a rational being must regard himself as intelligence (and not from the
side of his lower powers), as belonging to the world of understanding and
not to that of the senses. Thus he has two standpoints from which he can
consider himself and recognize the laws of the employment of his powers
and consequently of all his actions: first, as belonging to the world of sense,
under laws of nature (heteronomy), and, second, as belonging to the intelligible world under laws which, independent of nature, are not empirical but
founded only on reason. 12

In a passage like this one we encounter what is necessary for the operation
of a Kantian system of perspectives: an object or objects I3 on which one has
perspectives, and modes of access to those objects which determine the character
of the perspectives. Now we of course encounter the sensible world via the
cognitive apparatus whose workings Kant describes in the first Critique. The
intelligible world is closed to us except for what the practical perspective discloses: we are justified in believing about things in themselves-and this holds
for our beliefs about God as for all our beliefs about the denizens of the intelligible world-nothing beyond what our commitment to morality necessitates.
Morality commits us to two different sorts of beliefs about God, those about
Him as He is in Him~elf, and those about Him as He is for us as moral beings.
The former serve to determine His nature, the latter merely offer conceptions
of Him beneficial for the regulation of our behavior. The effort to construe
the latter theoretically is fruitless, for they are conceptually opaque viewed
from the theoretical perspective. 14 Of the first sort, the belief in God's existence is an example: it is a postulate of pure practical reason, a theoretical
proposition that can, however, be justified only on practical grounds. Examples of the second sort include many beliefs that are distinctively Christian
rather than simply theistic, not only the belief in God's tri-unity that has
already been mentioned, but beliefs such as those regarding atonement and
election as well. It is worse than unsettling for Palmquist's interpretation to
discover that many key Christian doctrines, while capable of a practical
reading, nevertheless prove to be "unsuited to man's powers of comprehension" and lead to contradiction when regarded theoretically. IS It is, I say,
worse than unsettling: it is fatal.
Kant thus finds himself committed to the following three claims:
(I)

Interpreted from a perspective other than the practical, experiences
thought by Christians to possess particular religious significance do not
in fact do so. (Petitionary prayer consists in talking to oneself.)
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(2) Interpreted from a perspective other than the practical, doctrines
thought by Christians to express fundamental religious truths are entirely
opaque. (The doctrine of Trinity is utterly impenetrable conceptually.)
(3) However, such experiences and doctrines do admit of a practical interpretation that renders the fonner significant and the latter understandable.

Pace Palmquist, the significance of (3) for Kant resides in the fact that the
practical interpretations to which reference is there made offer the only link
the Critical philosophy permits to many teachings of traditional Christianity;
however tenuous the connection of these interpretations to their more robust
Christian sources, they are all Kant's position allows him; to belittle or abandon them is to forsake any connection whatsoever. The texts will simply not
permit one to pretend, as Palmquist does, that other perspectives (e.g., the
theoretical) are legitimate but unemphasized. As Christianity teaches us about
the supersensible, not only do the statements about it allow only a practical
justification or none at all, many characteristically Christian statements about
it allow only a practical interpretatioll or none at all.
Nevertheless, Palmquist has raised an interesting question about Critical
philosophy understood broadly: if orthodox Christianity is incompatible with
Kant's texts, what modifications might be recommended to a Kantian philosopher who wished to accommodate himself to the Christian religion?
First of all, it should be noted that intellectual space must be made not only
for Christian ideas but also for Christian history. Despite Palmquist's sanguine remarks to the contrary (p. 73), it seems clear that Kant's conceptual
scheme is going to have difficulty admitting the possibility of miraculous
events and in particular of the resurrection. Yet this need not bother the
Kantian Christian unduly: philosophical and scientific developments since
Kant's day have made it fairly clear that the Principles of the Transcendental
Analytic are not acceptable as they stand in any case, and the need for any
viable new set of Principles to be at least consistent with Christian history is
one that the Kantian can probably satisfy as easily as any of the others
occasioned by intellectual developments of the past two centuries. What is
crucial to a Kantian position, after all, would seem to be the doctrine that our
categories structure our experience, and surely not that the categories be
identical with the ones Kant claimed to discover in the Metaphysical Deduction. It must seem to contemporary Kantians (or to a good many of them)
that there are indefinitely many alternative conceptual schemes that are capable of organizing our perceptual world; the task of finding among them
one that is able to address scientific, philosophical, and Christian concerns
should not prove beyond achievement.
However, the status of Christian doctrine still remains problematic for the
Kantian, and on at least two grounds. First, even granting that there may be
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alternative conceptual schemes, the Kantian may still wish to endorse, for
any such scheme, the distinction between what we can think and what we
can know. If the latter is limited to the sensible realm, and if what can be
rationally believed in the realm of the former is limited to what can be
practically justified, then the Kantian who would also be a Christian believer
faces severe difficulties: insofar as doctrine concerns the supersensible, it is
not capable of being known, and there is no reason to think that, interpreted
theoretically, very much of it would lend itself to practical justification.
Second, not only do many Christian doctrines deal with the supersensible, of
those that do some central ones, as we have seen, cannot be understood
theoretically. Kant finds these beyond our conceptual grasp, and it is doubtful
that any conceptual scheme that might be substituted for the original set of
categories will be of any help here.
Evidently, the practical perspective of the Critical philosophy is insufficient
for making the Christian faith intelligible, let alone for grounding it. The
Kantian need not abandon his commitment to practical foundations -of religion, but he must supplement them if he would also be a Christian. What is
wanted, then, is a way of grasping Christian truths that enables us to escape
the difficulties mentioned above and yet that does as little damage as possible
to the Critical approach to religion. Four desiderata might be mentioned as
criteria to be satisfied by any admissible supplement:
(1)

The spirit of the Critical philosophy must not be violated, and analyses
of empirical experience, morality, art, etc., in the Kantian style must not
be impaired.

(2) Access to the supersensible beyond the inferences legitimated by morality must be assured, yet (in keeping with (1)) the means must not be of
the rational sort exposed by Kant as dialectical inferences in the second
half of the first Critique.
(3) In fact the mode of access must transcend the limits imposed by the
conceptual, if the Christian mysteries are to be regained as doctrine.
(4) The access to the supersensible must issue in something like knowledge;
if the absence of conceptual involvement (by (3» means that neither
knowledge nor experience in the technical Kantian senses is to be understood here, still something akin to Kantian theoretical cognitionsomething that permits more than the practical interpretation and
justification to which Kant limits us regarding so many religious
claims-must result.

Now I would suggest that, put this way, the supplement to the Critical philosophy that the Kantian who would be a Christian is seeking, or at any rate
a significant component of it, is to be found in the intuition of the Divine to
which Christian mystics have laid claim for the better part of two millenia.
Such an intuition purports to offer a non-conceptual cognition of the super-
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sensible, thus satisfying criteria (2) through (4). To be sure, Kant himself
recognizes no such capacity in us: intellectual intuition, Kant's model of the
Divine mode of knowing, which shares some-though not all-characteristics with mystical intuition, is regularly denied by him to humans, and the
best Kant can suggest about the mystics is that they have correctly described
but mistakenly anticipated the cognitive condition of the afterlife. However,
the difficulty with the first criterion goes beyond the mere fact that Kant does
not recognize a human ability to intuit the supersensible (in this life); one
might suggest that Kant cannot acknowledge such a capacity in us: mystical
union might be thought to endanger autonomy, and the conditions of the unity
of consciousness might be considered incapable of satisfaction once a nonspatio-temporal mystical intuition has been admitted. These issues assuredly
deserve attention; I shall say here only that I am confident that nothing
essential to Kantianism is sacrificed or rendered inconsequent by the recognition of mysticism as a legitimate cognitive mode.
Of course, the suggestion here is not that mystical intuition alone will lead
a thinker to recognizably Christian doctrine; the variety of religions with
which the mystical life has been successfully intertwined might make such a
claim implausible to many. Rather, what I recommend is that the Kantian,
who believes that reason alone leads to practical analogues of so many Christian beliefs, employ these practical teachings along with the intuitions of the
mystics as two points from which to "triangulate" Christian doctrine. For
example, a trinitarian teaching that possessed significance for practical but
not for theoretical reason might provide the context within which mystical
experience could supply the lack and render that teaching significant in a
sense akin to the theoretical after all. 16
The advantage of this approach, of course, is that we are able to navigate
the philosophical shoals on which Palmquist's reading foundered: reference
to mystical experience enables the Kantian philosopher to preserve an appropriately critical stance toward religion without succumbing to reductivism,
as beyond the moral interpretation of doctrine grounds are now provided for
granting Christian teachings a theoretical status as well. Palmquist is correct
in recognizing that to view the Critical philosophy as plausibly Christian,
doctrine must not be interpreted exclusively from the practical perspective.
While he is wrong in failing to perceive that Kant allows himself no other
interpretation for some of the crucial articles of Christian faith, there is reason
to believe that his aim is one that, fortunately for the Kantian who wants to
consider himself a Christian, can nevertheless be carried through without
compromise in either the philosophical or the religious sphere.

Hope College and the National Endowment for the Humanities
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NOTES

1. Stephen Palmquist, "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?" Faith and Philosophy, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 65-75. Further references to this article will be by way of page
numbers enclosed in parentheses and included in the body of the text.
2. Stephen Palmquist, "Knowledge and Experience: An Examination of the Four
Reflective 'Perspectives' in Kant's Critical Philosophy," Kant-Studien, vol. 78 (1987), p.
196.

3. Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M.
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1960), p. 183;
Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (hereafter, GS) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (and
predecessors) 1902 -), vol. 6, p. 194.

4. Ibid., pp. 184-85; GS, vol. 6, pp. 195-96.

5. Ibid., p. 185 (italics in original); GS, vol. 6, p. 197.
6. A protest really must be entered regarding Palmquist's efforts to demonstrate the
breadth and openness of Critical views by appeal to quasi-Critical and pre-Critical writings
such as the Lectures on Ethics and the Dreams ofa Spirit-Seer (which in any case is hardly
an unambiguous support for his claims). His use of the Opus PostulIlum is almost as
worrisome.
7. What Kant seems to find "monstrous" in the reports of some mystics is the alleged
"fusion" with God. (See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings
in Moral Philosophy, trans. and ed. Lewis White Beck (New York and London: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1976); GS, vol. 5, pp. 120-21; also see vol. 8, p. 335.) Presumably such
a result is to be avoided as undercutting human autonomy. More modest mystical claims
Kant seems prepared to grant, but only when relegated to the life to come; see vol. 28. 2,
2, pp. 1267-68.
8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1968), A 222-3/B 270 (latter italics mine). Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, sec.
35; GS, vol. 4, p. 317.
9. Kant, Religion, p. 129; GS, vol. 6, p. 137. The "General Observation" to Book III of
the Religion contains Kant's chief discussion of religious mysteries and makes transparent
his view that numerous Christian doctrines are intelligible from the practical standpoint
andfrom none other. See Religion, pp. 129-38; GS, vol. 6, pp. 137-47.
10. Ibid., p. 131; GS, vol. 6, p. 139.

11. It is, of course, true that in considering the doctrine of the Trinity a mystery,
Christianity has traditionally allied itself with Kant's view that it exceeds our conceptual
grasp. However, the traditional position affirms precisely what Kant denies: the notion of
God as Trinity yields a conception that is theoretically correct, or has an element of
theoretical correctness about it. However dim and imperfect this conception may be, it is
superior to all other conceptions not because of its affinities to some description of God's
moral relationship to us but because it dimly and imperfectly expresses a theoretical truth
about God Himself.
12. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings, p. 107; GS, vol. 4, p. 452.
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13. Whether Kant's system calls for just one world toward which we adopt different
points of view or more than one is a vexed issue; Kant is notorious for seeming to suggest
now the one position, now the other. The interpretive issue is irrelevant when the discussion concerns God and does not affect the problems that arise with Palmquist's account.
14. When Kant says, "Now we can with justice require of every mystery offered for
belief that we understand what it is supposed to mean," he means (as he in fact says in
his discussion of the mystery of the Trinity) that understanding occurs here, but only in
the practical context; mysteries thwart any effort at theoretical understanding. See Religion, p. 135n; GS, vol 6, p. 144n.
15. See Kant, Religion, pp. 133-34; GS, vol. 6, pp. 142-43.
16. I have in mind, of course, those experiences in which Christian mystics have
encountered God as triune. On their own, such experiences might not be recognized as
revelatory of God's nature, but Kant's moral perspective could furnish precisely the
framework within which such recognition could occur.

